WangLu's Notes

I want to filter the outgoing network traffic for all of my containers based on a set of rules. For example: Some containers should be blocked from accessing the internet entirely. Some containers should have unrestricted internet access. Some containers should be able to access the internet, but not a specific list of URLs. Some containers should only be allowed to access a specific list of URLs. To manage this, I will define logical policy groups and assign each container to one. As a general rule, only DNS and HTTP/HTTPS traffic will be permitted. Option 1: A Proxy for Each Policy Group Imagine Container A is only allowed to access  www.google.com . Here’s how this approach would work: Create an Nginx (or  socat ) container that listens on port 443 and acts as a reverse proxy for  www.google.com . Place both the Nginx proxy and Container A into an  internal  container network. Within this network, add  www.google.com  as a network alias for the Ngin...

For the last few days, I've been experimenting with Podman. My goal was to get a feel for the setup, create a minimal yet scalable environment for a few containers, and identify potential problems early on. Here are my notes from this experience. [Updates 2025-09-21] Added more networking options and other information. Quadlet Quadlet  allows you to define containers, networks and more using a syntax similar to systemd. This includes helpful features like drop-in overrides and templates. The framework is tightly integrated with systemd, and Quadlet actually generates real systemd units. This means I can directly write systemd options in my Quadlet files. One of the biggest benefits I've found is how easy Quadlet makes it to set up socket activation. This allows me to place some containers in an internal network or even without a network at all. Hardening Defaults Let's say I have a group of Systemd and Quadlet units, all named in the format of  xyz-* . My goal is to define ...

My original plan was to stabilize my  VM pipeline  before deploying containers using a hardened stack of Podman, QEMU, SELinux, and user namespaces ( --userns=auto ). However, the pipeline's complexity grew, requiring script rewrites and schema redesigns, and the process took much longer than anticipated. In the meantime, an interesting alternative has captured my attention:  gVisor . It occupies a unique space between traditional SELinux policies and full-blown virtual machines, offering a compelling set of trade-offs. What is gVisor? At its core, gVisor is an application kernel, written in the memory-safe language Go, that provides an additional layer of isolation between containerized applications and the host operating system. It's essentially a user-space implementation of the Linux kernel's system call interface. The security model is explained  here . gVisor in Practice gVisor provides an OCI-compliant runtime called  runsc , which can be almost transpare...